

















Economic history is an important sub-discipline of Economics.
2 Women in economic 
history face similar challenges to their female colleagues in mainstream economics. In 
the UK, economic history has been affected by government policies aimed at 
evaluating research. The Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs) have been criticized 
for penalizing interdisciplinary work. In addition, such assessment frameworks are not 
likely to be gender neutral. They are a product of the existing academic elite and that 
elite is currently overwhelmingly male. Evidence presented using the Economic 
History Society Census of 2007 shows that well-established staff can fast-track their 
careers. The gap between them and other members of the academic community then 
widens. This has (unintended) consequences for gender equality at work as women 
tend to be clustered at lower ranks.  
 
Keywords: Women’s careers, Economic History, Academic labor market, Research 
Assessment Exercise. 





I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Women’s careers in economics have been the focus of much recent research. 
Comparisons across countries show evidence that women are underrepresented in 
academic economics compared with other cognate disciplines. There is concern that 
this situation has not improved with time, and may be worsening in some cases. So, it 
is not simply a cohort effect on its own. Some have claimed that women are less able 
or less suited to highly quantitative subjects than men are. The most recent furor was 
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caused by Larry Summers when he was at Harvard University. Economic history can 
easily include qualitative social history, so if we accepted Summers’ hypothesis we 
might expect women to do relatively better in economic history. Instead, evidence 
from the Economic History Society (EHS) 2007 census shows that in the UK, women 
with research interests in economic history are still underrepresented at the higher 
ranks. This is even when considering history departments rather than economics 
departments and business schools.  
 
The UK system also grades departments on the quality of the research and funds them 
based on those grades. This system was called the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) and will soon be replaced with another system (the Research Excellence 
Framework or REF). The RAEs have been criticized for creating distortions within 
the UK higher education community, especially with regard to hiring and promotion 
policies. Lower-ranked, part-time and teaching-only staff have been particularly badly 
affected. Women are disproportionately represented in these categories. So, there are 
(presumably) unintended consequences for women’s careers. The RAEs have also 
been accused of undervaluing interdisciplinary work. If this is true, then the RAEs 
pose two sets of problems for women working in economic history. The design of a 
national system of research assessment is not necessarily neutral with regard to 
gender, even if it claims to be.  
 
The RAE requires institutions to submit evidence of research outputs to subject 
panels.
3 A grade is given to each department. The RAE in 2001 used a system from 1 
(low quality) to 5* (high quality).Government funding is allocated according to grade. 
Interdisciplinary work does not easily fit into the panel system. Economic history 
could feasibly be related to at least five panels.
4 The RAE2001 economics and 
econometrics panel was to cover “all aspects of economics and econometrics, whether 
theoretical or applied (including, where appropriate, economic history).” The history 
panel was to cover “all aspects of the study of the past except those specifically 
falling within the remit of other panels including, for example: Political, Economic, 
business and Social History …”(RAE Circular 2001). Business history was put with 
management under Panel 43. Despite these regulations, departments could choose 
which panel(s) they wished to apply to. So, economic historians were not always put 
forward for the economics and econometrics panel. It difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess economic history research using the RAE panel grades assigned to 
departments. 
 
There is little concrete information ex ante about how a panel will judge 
interdisciplinary work. The RAE regulations require that panel members liaise with 
other panels or with outside experts to judge the quality of interdisciplinary work. 
There have been concerns that these steps are not sufficient to protect this type of 
research and consequently safeguard academic careers. Departments might prefer to 
hire people whose work is mainstream rather than interdisciplinary, purely due to risk 
aversion. As the finer details of each RAE round are not known in advance, 
departments make educated guesses. The effects of the RAEs on interdisciplinary 
researchers’ careers may be substantial, but these effects have been difficult to track.  
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In the past, it has not been clear whether UK careers in economic history follow the 
trends of particular parent departments or form a pattern of their own. Economic 
historians are based in different faculties. Many research articles and policy 
documents separate humanities and arts from social science and business. This article 
uses the EHS census of 2007 to investigate the UK economic history research 
community. Analysis of this data provides some evidence that senior staff reap the 
benefits of the RAE system, even if they work in economic history. The RAE 
exacerbates cohort, and hence gender, effects for researchers in economic history. 
Membership of the EHS may ameliorate the situation for its women members. This 
might be due to networking or mentoring. With regard to the highest rank, only men 
seem to be able to charge a premium to move to certain regions of the UK. Women do 
not seem to do this. The premium seems to be linked to poor performance in 
RAE2001 by Celtic nations in particular panels. It is consistent with the hypothesis 
that lower-ranked departments must offer more, and use promotion, to try to buy in 
researchers for the next RAE round. As these established researchers tend to be male, 
then RAE premia widen the gap between men and women’s career paths.  
 
II.  RESEARCH INTO ACADEMIC CAREERS 
 
There is a large body of recent research into the academic careers of female 
economists. Studies of the academic labor market have been undertaken for several 
countries. There is also a body of literature relating to the health of the economic 
history profession. The two research strands are not usually combined. In the UK 
case, there is the added complication of the RAE system which has generated an area 
of research of its own. (For example, Tony Brinn, Michael John Jones, and Maurice 
Pendlebury 2001.)  
 
Feminist economics had a special issue devoted to the status of women economists in 
universities. Evidence from the US, the UK, Canada and China showed 
commonalities (Joyce P. Jacobsen 2006a). Firstly, the proportion of women amongst 
academic economists was lower than amongst academics in general. Secondly, 
women were most heavily represented at the lower rungs of the career ladder. 
Jacobsen argues that for the US and the UK data, this cannot be explained as a cohort 
effect. Women have lower probabilities of progressing to the next rank than men do 
(Joyce P. Jacobsen 2006b; Jonathan Burton, David H. Blackaby, Jane Humphries, and 
Heather Joshi 2006). There were international differences. China had a higher degree 
of representation of women at all ranks relative to capitalist countries. Also, there was 
no significant difference between Chinese men and women in responses to questions 
about whether the respondent had made career sacrifices due to their spouse’s career 
(Xiaobo Wang and Xiao-Yuan Dong 2006). In Canada, women were six to eight 
times more likely to leave or change jobs to accommodate their spouse’s career 
choices than men were (Roberta Edgecombe Robb 2006).  
 
The UK evidence presented above followed from the Royal Economic Society (RES) 
survey of 2002. Booth and Burton presented evidence from the 1998 Survey (Alison 
L. Booth, Jonathan Burton, and Karen Mumford 2000). They found no statistically 
significant difference between the relative positions of women in post 92 and older 4 
universities, or between departments with different RAE rankings.
5 Women were not 
heavily represented at the top ranks. Booth and Burton’s findings are similar to those 
found by a demographic review of 2006 (David Mills, Anne Jepson, Tony Coxon, 
Mark Easterby-Smith, Phil Hawkins, and Jonathan Spencer 2006).  
 
With only 22 percent of all staff being women, economics has the smallest 
proportion of female employees of all the social sciences […] Only 5 percent 
(15 out of 295) of economics Professors are female […] This is the lowest 
percentage in the social sciences and can be compared with around 25 percent 
female professorships in Anthropology and Sociology.  
 
Mills et al found that history is also male-dominated. 70 percent of staff were male 
and 24 percent of staff were aged over 55 (Mills et al 2006: 59-60). The UK’s Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) results show that, for the academic year 2007 to 
2008, overall 18.7 percent of professors were female (HESA 2008).  
 
Economic history as a sub-discipline has not received the same attention as its parent 
disciplines. Lists of economic historians have been compiled, such as Farnie’s Bio-
Bibliography of Economic and Social History (Douglas A. Farnie 2005). Articles 
have appeared on the state of the discipline and the future directions it should take. 
For example, Coleman criticized the move in the mid-twentieth century towards 
separate economic history departments in the UK (Donald Cuthbert Coleman 1987). 
(This trend has now reversed.) There are surveys of the representation of women 
within the economic history research community. Wrigley’s survey of the Economic 
History Review showed that 13.6 percent of articles published in 1990-7 were written 
by women (E. A. Wrigley 1999). Subacchi’s meta-analysis of the Eleventh 
International Economic History Congress showed that male attendees outnumbered 
women by four to one (Paola Subacchi 1995). These studies tend to concern the 
international community of economic historians rather than a particular nation. They 
give insights into gender issues, but are not easily comparable with work on the 
academic labor market which tend to focus on national case studies.  
 
In the UK, there is also the special case of the RAE system. The RAEs have improved 
incentives to publish research but there have been concerns about its overall effect on 
the UK academic community. Elton noted that “all performance indicators distort 
performance”. He cited the impact of the first RAEs when the number of refereed 
journal articles was used as a main indicator of quality. A large number of new 
journals were created. Researchers increased their number of publications by 
rehashing their work or splitting it into smaller chunks. It may also have encouraged 
short-termism as people rushed to publish articles. Elton has argued that the 
unintended consequences of the earlier RAEs were often longer-term and will be 
harder to fix when they do appear (Lewis Elton 2000). 
 
Firstly, there was concern that early career staff and those who had taken career 
breaks were discriminated against. Some attempts have been made to correct these 
distortions. However, many women do take a career break of some sort, for example 
for maternity leave. The RAEs have changed the academic labor market as they 
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provide incentives for institutions to buy in star researchers before an RAE. These 
people can demand a premium. Conversely, those at lower ranks may be forced to 
take up the extra teaching and administration duties or to face cost-cutting measures 
such as short-term or part-time contracts. As women are already over-represented at 
these lower ranks in the UK, then the gender gap in rank, status and pay could become 
worse.  
 
Secondly, the RAEs are problematic in assessing highly interdisciplinary subjects 
such as economic history. A report commissioned by the UK HE funding bodies 
found that departments and researchers widely believed that the RAE “inhibits 
interdisciplinary research” (Evaluation Associates 1999). Around four-fifths of the 
academics surveyed engaged in interdisciplinary work.
6 The report stated that 
“overall, RAE 1996 panels did not strongly discriminate for or against 
interdisciplinary research, although the most interdisciplinary researchers received 
slightly lower ratings”. The proportion of interdisciplinary research varied across 
fields and that there was lower interdisciplinarity for economics (31 percent). 
However, it is the perception, rather than the reality, of how RAEs will work that 
matters in the hiring market. The report noted that the most interdisciplinary 
researchers were affected. Some types of economic history could easily fall into this 
category.  
 
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 2006 survey did look at staff in 
specialist economic history units. It noted that they were ranked highly in the previous 
RAE (Mills et al 2006: 23 Table 2.5). However, it also found that many economic 
historians actually worked in other locations. This was confirmed by the results of the 
EHS census which showed that only 5 percent of the academics listed were in 
specialist units (Helen Julia Paul 2007). So the ESRC report did not study the effects 
of the RAE on the majority of economic history researchers.  
 
Under the RAE system mainstream neoclassical economics became the only game in 
town (Frederic S. Lee 2007). The economics panel judged research by whether it was 
published in certain “core” journals. A survey undertaken in the early years of the 
RAE showed how this system developed (Sandra Harley and Frederic S. Lee 1997). 
Respondents noted that they were under pressure to move to the mainstream and to 
hire colleagues on the basis of their publications in these core journals. One stated, 
“forcing academics to publish in core journals is a form of censorship – it conditions 
what you say and how you say it, as well as determining areas of research and 
research methodologies”. Some respondents were planning to move out of the 
economics department into another post at the same university, purely to move under 
the aegis of a different RAE panel. Many job advertisements stressed publications in 
the journals important to the RAE economics panel. One person stated that “my own 
department, having got a 3 in the last RAE is in headlong pursuit of a 5, by buying in 
publications in core journals”. 
 
Researchers who tailor their work to the UK system in economics might find that it 
did not improve their reputation elsewhere. This may hamper their opportunities in 
the international labor market. It is possible that a well-respected mainstream journal 
in economics would be happy to publish a purely cliometric article, which was not 
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considered ground-breaking or even particularly convincing by other economic 
historians. Such an article would count towards a submission to the economics and 
econometrics RAE panel. This creates disincentives to be truly innovative as it means 
sticking to work which is familiar to mainstream economics or mainstream history. 
Economists are less familiar with approaches in economic history beyond pure 
cliometrics. historians are not likely to have the necessary background in economic 
theory or quantitative methods. Yet, there is no specialist RAE panel for economic 
history. The subject may be judged by people who are either economists or historians, 
but not both. These judgments will then have effects upon the academic labor market 
and people’s careers in academe.  
 
III.  DATA 
 
The data used are from the Census of Economic historians in UK Higher Education 
(Paul 2007). The data were collated from university websites in 2007 before the start 
of the new academic year. All university websites listed on the Higher Education and 
Research Opportunities in the UK (HERO) website were checked. All departmental 
or school pages relating to history, business, management and economics were used. 
All staff research interests on these pages were then checked. Academics employed 
by an HE institution and who had some listed research interest in economic, business 
or accounting history were included. Some were found in a variety of other 
departments such as geography or languages. They were located by looking at 
research groupings and also using the general search engine for the university. The 
census shows all those who expressed a research interest in economic history or 
related fields. This does not mean that these people consider themselves to be, first 
and foremost, economic historians. They may combine economic history with other 
work. They may label themselves as archaeologists, social historians or accountants. 
A list of people whose top priority was economic history would probably duplicate 
the EHS membership list. 
 
The census has its limitations. As it was not a questionnaire-based study, private 
information was not accessible. This includes information about salary, career breaks, 
and any issues of personal identity such as ethnic origin. It is not known whether 
individuals are tenured or not, although senior lecturers and above will be tenured. 
There is no way of measuring individual ability or effort. A listed interest does not 
necessarily imply that an individual is research active. Nor does a teaching-only 
contract imply that an individual is research inactive. In the UK, Teaching 
Fellowships have replaced the title of Temporary Lecturer. They often involve a 
research component so the name is misleading. The job title for staff members was 
taken from their website. Sometimes, titles are ambiguous. For example, the rank of 
fellow can refer to a temporary contract or the membership of an Oxbridge college.  
   
Variables 
 
Academic ranks have been grouped into the following categories: Rank 0, rank 
unstated, ambiguous or not academic title; Rank 1, postdoctoral early career grades 
such as postdoctoral research fellowship or teaching fellowship; Rank 2, lecturers, 
both tenured and probationary; Rank 3, senior lecturers and readers; Rank 4, 7 
professors and chairs.
7 Doctoral students and emeritus staff were removed from the 
dataset. 
 
The census listed departmental location by region as listed in HERO, for example, 
south western England. The data was recoded to identify location under two different 
systems. The variables ‘loc*” refer to nations. For example, Loc1. is England. The 
second system is to identify institutions within London (Lon), the rest of England 
(roe) and the Celtic Fringe i.e. Scotland, N. Ireland and Wales (cf).  These systems 
would give rise to multicollinearity if used together. This analysis uses the second 
system only. London has much greater economic and political power than the rest of 
the UK, and the celtic nations are at the periphery. 
 
Some new variables were created which do not appear in the original census. EHS 
was created to identify individuals who were members of the EHS.  The Institution 
variable was identifies post 92 institutions. THES identifies membership of an 
institution which was listed in The Times Higher World University Rankings 2006. 
This was a timely measure of the quality of the research environment and also of the 
institution’s ability to fund and support academic careers. There is a problem of 
multicollinearity with Institution and THES as all the top-ranked universities are also 
old universities (not former polytechnics). All dummy variables take the value of one 
if the researcher is a member of the category listed and zero otherwise. 
 
The census gave information about the departmental affiliation of academics. People 
interested in economic history turned up in a wide variety of places including classics 
and archaeology, geography, economics, accounting, history and cultural studies. 
Very few people worked in a dedicated economic history unit. Four departmental 
categories were created. Anyone working in a history department or something 
closely related such as classics, archaeology or a museum was put into Dept 1. 
Anyone in a more quantitative subject area, including economics, management and 
business schools was put into Dept 2. Anyone working in a department with no direct 
connection to either of the above categories, such as geography or french, was put into 
Dept 3. Anyone who worked in a specialist economic history grouping which was not 
a subgroup of either Dept1 or Dept2 was put into Dept4. There are some clear 
groupings of economic historians, say at the University of Oxford, but the members 
are also clearly part of a faculty. Therefore, faculty or school level decisions will have 
an impact. This was particularly true in the run-up to RAE 2008.  
 
Data relating to the RAE refers to the round in 2001. For RAE2001, Panel 38 was 
economics and econometrics (including where appropriate economic history). Panel 
43 was business and management studies (including business history). Panel 44 was 
accounting and finance (RAE 2001: RAE4/01). Panel 59 was history, but in the 
results table it did include economic history in some instances. The London school of 
economics and Politics (LSE) submitted two separate units to Panel 59. One was 
economic history which received a grade of 5. Therefore, the panel system is 
extremely difficult to unravel, as economic history is only part of Panel 38 ‘where 
appropriate’. The LSE clearly felt that it was inappropriate.  
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Some economics departments were merged into business schools for receiving a low 
grade in Panel 38. Therefore, an academic working in a business school in 2007 may 
have survived a low grade from Panel 38 and been moved into the business school. 
Alternatively, he or she might have been in the business school to start with and been 
congratulated on helping to achieve a good grade in Panel 43. It is not safe to simply 
average grades between panels either. For example, City University got a grade of 3a 
in Panel 38 and 5 in Panel 43. Any weighted average or ‘best choice’ is meaningless. 
Even the subgroup of accounting historians cannot be easily assigned. The relevant 
RAE2001 panel should be Panel 44. Some institutions put their accountancy group in 
with management in general for Panel 43. RAE grades are not useful for interpreting 
the strength of scholarship in economic history. 
 
IV  ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
 
The basic results from the census are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. Just over 40 
percent of those with a research interest in economic history join the EHS. (EHS 
membership may be a signal of the place that economic history occupies in the 
academic’s own research priorities.) Unsurprisingly, most researchers are based in 
England, which has a far-highly population than the celtic nations combined. Women 
are in the minority and make up one quarter of the population overall. (For the 
subgroup of accounting historians, women make up one third of the group.)  
 
Table 1.   Descriptive statistics for categorical variables, composition (percent) of academics, 
UK-based academics with research interests in Economic History, 2007 (N=611)
Member of Economic History Society 44
Female 24
Based in:
History or related department 56
Economics or related department 29
Department not related to History or Economics 9
Specialist Economic History Center 5
Institution listed in THES 2006 list 63
Post 92 institution 17
London 14








Lecturer (both tenured and not) 26
Senior Lecturer and Reader 18
Professor 35
Note: The data are from the Economic History Society 2007 Census, and the sample is 
restricted to current academic staff on contract (excluding Emeritus)
































































































































































































































































































































































Most researchers identified in the census are based in history departments of one type 
or another. Around 30 percent are in economics, management or business schools. A 
large majority (63 percent) are in institutions listed in the THES World Rankings 
2006. Relatively few are in the new universities. It is to be expected that research-
orientated institutions are more likely to appear in a census focusing on research 
interests. The census does not show those who have been forced to give up research or 
move out of academia.  
 
The researchers based in economics or history departments and whose rank is known 
are shown in Figure 1. The profile shows that there are a relatively large number of 
male professors but a smaller number of individuals at each rank below them. There is 
a disparity between men and women at the top rank. That disparity appears to lessen 
at the lower ranks. However, this profile may indicate that the UK economic history 
profession has a large number of academics reaching retirement who are not being 
replaced. Considering that the two ranks of senior lecturer and reader are combined 
here, there are not many people to promote and replace the existing professors. 
Overall 35 percent of the researchers listed were at professorial rank. HESA statistics 
for 2007/08 show that for all UK academic staff, 10 percent were professors; 21 
percent were senior lecturers or readers and 30 percent were lecturers (HESA 2008). 
This pyramid demographic is not repeated by the economic history profession which 
is decidedly top-heavy. However, the EHS census results show that for economic 
historians in history (and related) departments, 15 percent of the professors were 
female. For the economics (and related) departments, 18 percent of the professors 
were female. This is better than for mainstream economics’ level of 5 percent in 1998 
as quoted above.    
 
There are relatively few academics at early career rank.
8 A variety of reasons may be 
posited for this. There may be a lessening of interest in economic history. Some early 
career staff have not yet published sufficiently to easily identify them from their 
website profiles. The lower numbers could reflect difficulties facing early career staff 




As the dependent variable (academic rank) is not continuous, Logistic regression has 
been used.
9 A rank can be assigned to most individuals in the EHS census (87 
percent). Pay and duration of employment contract are unknown. So rank gives a 
broad indication of an individual’s place on the career ladder. It does not allow any 
consideration of salary differences within a rank, which can be considerable. 
However, analyses of salaries come from survey responses and the census data does 
not. The census gives a better coverage of this group of academics than a survey 
would (as survey response rates tend to be less than 50 percent). So, there is a trade-
off between coverage and detail. Rank is useful in the UK case due to the possible 
effects of the RAEs on the labor market. One of the hypotheses to be tested is that 
some departments are put under pressure to hire academics whose work will boost 
RAE grades. If the department has a low RAE rank, and hence less research funding, 
it might need to attract and keep certain staff members by promoting them in rank. In 
                                                 
8 There are no accounting historians listed at this rank in the census, for example. 
9 Models were run using STATA version 9. See J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese 2001. 11 
other words, researchers who can show that their work is favored by the RAE system 
will have a lot of power in the labor market. Their careers will be fast-tracked and 
they should move up the ranks more quickly. They might accept a higher rank in 
exchange for moving to a low RAE grade department (which is constrained for 
funding). A higher grade RAE department has more power in the labor market and 
can resist pressure to fast-track researchers up the grades of the career ladder. It can 
simply buy in people at their existing grade.  
 
Table 2. Ordered logistic regression results for academic rank, UK-based researchers  
in Economic History, 2007
Std. Std.
Coeff. error  OR error
(β) of β [exp(β)] for OR
Female -0.644** 0.0187 0.525** 0.098
Based in Economics department -0.017 0.178 0.954 0.334
Type of Institution
Celtic Fringe 0.457* 0.211 1.579* 0.169
THES list 2006 -0.192 0.168 0.825 0.138
Number of cases 516
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 18.64 (4)**
Pseudo R² 0.01
Akaike Information Criterion 2.571
Notes: The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is 
restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts and whose rank is known.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Source: EHS Census 2007
Log. (relative odds) Odds ratio
 
 
For the researchers whose rank is known, the results of an ordered logistic regression 
with rank as the dependent variable are shown in Table 2. Being based in an 
economics department or a highly-ranked research institution does not have a 
statistically significant effect upon rank. If the researcher is based in a celtic 
institution, then there seems to be a statistically significant effect (p <0.05). This is 
positive and implies that ceteris paribus locating to the Celtic Fringe has a positive 
effect on career progression. The model implies that researchers in celtic universities 
had 1.6 times the odds of reaching a particular academic rank rather than a lower one, 
than their counterparts in England (p <0.05).  
 
These results are unexpected. The RAE system might be expected to speed up career 
progression within research-focused universities as they competed to attract those 
with the right publication record. Taking this result alone, it may be that economic 
history work is less valuable in the RAE hiring frenzy, for reasons which have been 
discussed above. However, economics departments have a clear preference for 
researchers whose work is published as journal articles rather than books. This is 12 
because the economics panels in the RAEs do not value books highly, whilst 
humanities panels do. So, it might be expected that being in an economics department 
would have an appreciable negative effect upon rank. No such result appears here. 
Economic historians may have managed to publish in mainstream journals, or perhaps 
they have simply already left economics departments. However, at first glance, there 
seems little reason why there should be any effect of location upon rank. All UK 
institutions face the RAE system. The celtic countries have plenty of research-
orientated institutions which compete in the international labor market. 
 
The gender effect upon rank was expected and is consistent with work done elsewhere 
on women’s academic careers. There is a statistically significant negative relationship 
between being female and moving up the career ladder. Men have twice the odds of 
reaching a particular rank (rather than the ones below it) than women do (p <0.01).
10  
 
Table 3.  Ordered logit regression results for academic rank, UK academics with 
research interests in Economic History based in History departments, 2007 
Std. Std.
Coeff. error  OR error
(β) of β [exp(β)] for OR
Female -0.698** 0.249 0.497** 0.124
Type of Institution
Celtic Fringe 0.026 0.281 1.026 0.289
THES list 2006 -0.200 0.219 0.980 0.214
Number of cases 292
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 7.93 (3)*
Pseudo R² 0.01
Akaike Information Criterion 2.567
Notes: The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is 
restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts, based in History and 
related subject departments and whose rank is known.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Source: EHS Census 2007
Log. (relative odds) Odds ratio
  
 
Further investigation of these results involved splitting the dataset into smaller 
segments. Academics based in history departments are the largest group (N = 292). 
The results of the ordered logistic regression on rank are shown in Table 3. In this 
group, the Celtic Fringe coefficient is no longer statistically significant. The 
coefficient for gender is (p <0.01) and it still implies a negative relationship between 
                                                 
10 The coefficient for Female is negative and the Odds Ratio is 0.525. The Odds Ratio is simply the 
exponential of the beta ( -0.644). It is difficult to express the result clearly as it stands. If the dummy 
variable coding was reversed so that Male took the value of 1 and Female of 0, the beta should be 
0.644. Exp(beta) now becomes 1.90 or close to 2. This makes the result easier to explain in words. The 
same procedure has been repeated wherever there is a similar case.    13 
being female and career progression. The odds have not changed much with men still 
having twice the odds of reaching a particular rank than their female counterparts (p 
<0.01). Table 4 shows the results for the economics group. The gender effect is still 
significant and echoes the results for historians (p <0.05). So, these results do not 
show that women find it easier to climb the career ladder in history departments. 
Larry Summers’ notion that women struggle with quantitative subjects would imply 
that women will find it easier to progress in humanities. The results shown here show 
no such safe haven. Nor does it appear outside options in the labor market have much 
effect on women’s careers. Economists may have lucrative outside options, but 
historians do not tend to. Yet, in this instance, academic women seem to have similar 
challenges in advancement across all departments.  
 
Table 4.  Ordered logit regression results for academic rank, UK academics with 
research interests in Economic History based in Economics departments, 
2007
Std. Std.
Coeff. error  OR error
(β) of β [exp(β)] for OR
Female -0.727* 0.339 0.483* 0.164
Type of Institution
THES list 2006 -0.400 0.310 0.670 0.208
Location of Institution
Celtic Fringe 0.998** 0.369 2.714** 1.001
Number of cases 153
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 15.41 (3)**
Pseudo R² 0.04
Akaike Information Criterion 2.53
Notes: The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is 
restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts and 
based in Economics and related subject departments, and whose rank is known.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Source: EHS Census 2007
Log. (relative odds) Odds ratio
 
 
For the economists, the coefficient for the Celtic Fringe institutions is statistically 
significant and has a positive effect on rank (p <0.01). The odds of a researcher in a 
celtic institution reaching a particular rank are almost 3 times that a researcher based 
in England (p <0.01). To consider gender and location effects separately, the group 
was split into male-only and female-only. If the Celtic Fringe effect is related to the 
RAE, it might be expected that an RAE labor market premium will be most obvious at 
the higher ranks. These ranks tend to contain the established researchers whose 
publication record in ‘core’ journals counts towards RAE grades. So a logistic 
regression with professorial rank as the dependent variable was used. Using the 
female-only dataset did not yield a model which was statistically significant from the 
intercept model. This may be because the size of the subgroup was small (N= 42) or it 
may be that the location effect does not apply to the female labor market. The results 
for the male-only dataset are in Table 5. The Celtic Fringe premium is clearly 14 
apparent. Now, the odds for a male researcher in a celtic university of reaching a 
particular rank rise to 3.11 times that of a male researcher in England (p <0.05). The 
coefficient for being in a THES 2006 institution is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 5. Logit regression results for professioral rank, UK-based male academics with 
research interests in Economic History based in Economics departments, 2007
Std. Std.
Coeff. error  OR error
(β) of β [exp(β)] for OR
Intercept -0.217 0.324 NA NA
Type of Institution
THES 2006 ranked -0.48 0.401 0.619 0.248
Location of Institution
Celtic Fringe 1.133* 0.455 3.11* 1.414
Number of cases 111
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 8.12(2)*
Pseudo R² 0.05
Akaike Information Criterion 1.357
restricted to all male academic staff at the top professorial rank who are based in 
Economics and related subject departments.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Source: EHS Census 2007
Log. (relative odds) Odds ratio
 
 
The premium for moving to the Celtic Fringe seems stronger at the highest rank. This 
is consistent with theories that RAE-based incentives have allowed well-established 
researchers to demand a premium. This premium seems to be concerned with 
economics-type departments and not history ones. Again, this points to the RAE as 
being part of the cause, as departmental-level activities are related to the RAE panel 
system. If the premium was something to do with the institutions themselves or 
national policies, then we would expect to see the same premium appearing amongst 
history staff.  
 
The effect could be due to inertia with celtic institutions retaining their older highly- 
ranked staff in economics and business schools. However, as all UK institutions face 
RAE pressures this is unlikely. The RAE effect on hiring to ‘buy in publications’ has 
been discussed above. A more convincing explanation is that celtic countries are at a 
relative disadvantage in the hiring market for economists. They are forced to offer a 
premium to retain staff and to attract new hires. This would imply that there was some 
sort of relative disadvantage for academics to move to Wales, Scotland and N. 
Ireland. These countries have lower population density overall, although Scotland’s 
central belt is an exception to this rule. It is relatively more difficult for a spouse to 
find employment in areas of low population or high unemployment. For certain jobs, 
such as finance, there are far more opportunities in south east England than there 
would be in Northern Ireland. Scotland’s silicon glen and Edinburgh’s financial sector 
are exceptions.  
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So for a premium to occur firstly there must be some sort of hurdle involved in 
moving. Secondly, the researcher must be able to demand that the premium is paid. 
Male economists seem to ask for, and get, such a premium. Historians do not. It is not 
clear what is happening for female economists as there are relatively few of them. 
Economists may be able to demand a premium due to more lucrative outside options 
than historians. Or, it may be partly due to the RAE gradings given to economics and 
business schools in the Celtic nations. If they have low grades, then it is less attractive 
to move to the periphery.   
 
Five celtic institutions make it into the THES 2006 ranking (Times Higher Education 
Supplement 2006). There are some well-regarded economics departments and 
business schools in the celtic countries. However, the RAE rankings for 2001 are 
interesting (RAE Outcome 2001). Panel 59 (history) ranks seven non-English 
institutions as 5 or 5*.
11 Panel 38 (economics and econometrics) has none. Panel 43 
(management) only has one (in Wales). These rankings determine how much research 
money flows from central government to each department. A low-ranked department 
may be desperate to hold on to any star researchers it does have and encourage new 
ones to join. If funds are more restricted, promoting someone at any earlier stage in 
their career may be cheaper than hiring in an expensive established professor. So, if 
the celtic nations fail to gain high grades in certain panels, they may have responded 
by buying in researchers and promoting them. 
 
Twenty-five people in the EHS census were accounting historians who are in 
accounting departments which submitted to Panel 44. Six celtic institutions gained at 
5 or 5* in this panel. Therefore, removing these twenty-five individuals should result 
in a stronger celtic premium effect if the RAE hypothesis is correct. For male 
researchers in departments submitting to panel 38 or 43, a further logistic regression 
was run with professorial rank as the dependent variable. The results of a logistic 
regression for professorial rank are given in Table 6. The Akaike Information 
Criterion is lower (1.349 as opposed to 1.357) which implies that the model without 
Panel 44 data is a better fit. The celtic premium is statistically significant (p <0.01) 
and the odds of a male researcher based in the celtic nations being at professorial rank 
are now four times that of a male researcher based in England. Removing those 
people whose departments targeted Panel 44 (RAE2001) where the celtic nations did 
well, shows that the celtic premium strengthens. In other words, when we consider 
that celtic nations did badly in the RAE2001 in panels 38 and 43, it is perhaps not 
surprising that they may have had to pay a job market premium in terms of career 
progression. There may be advantages and disadvantages in moving to the periphery, 
but the Celtic Fringe premium seems to be related to RAE grades in specific panels.  
 
                                                 
11 Other history-related panels also have 5 or 5* grades for Celtic institutions. Panel 57 (Classics, 
Ancient History etc.) has one 5 and Panel 58 (Archaeology) has two.  16 
Table 6.  Logistic regression results for Professorial rank, UK-based male academics 
researching in Economic History based in departments which submitted to 
Panel 38 (Economics) or 43 (Management) in RAE2001, 2007. 
Std. Std.
Coeff. error  OR error
(β) of β [exp(β)] for OR
Intercept -0.53 0.375 NA NA
Type of Institution
THES 2006 ranked -0.092 0.451 0.912 0.411
Location of Institution
Celtic Fringe 1.413** 0.517 4.110** 2.216
Number of cases 93
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 8.15(2)*
Pseudo R² 0.06
Akaike Information Criterion 1.349
Notes: The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the 
sample is restricted to male academic staff currently employed on contracts,
based in departments which submitted to Panels 38 or 43 of RAE2001.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Source: EHS Census 2007




If this is so, then only certain researchers can take advantage of this premium. Other 
studies seem to suggest that people have to publish in mainstream journals to be of 
interest to departments targeting the economics panel of the RAE. So, Economic 
historians might have to be well-established in order to have some papers which 
would suit. Or else, they may move out of economics altogether. This may partly 
explain why many researchers are based in history departments. For those who remain 
in economics, there seems to be evidence that the RAE does create bonuses for those 
people who are already part of the elite. That is, researchers who are well-established 
and at the top rank of the profession. Notably, these people tend to be male. Whether 
or not this was a cohort effect before the RAEs, it is not likely to be after them. For in 
economics, the elite and mainstream replicates itself. This has severe consequences 
for interdisciplinary subjects such as economic history. It also widens any gap 
between the top rank and the lower ranks of the profession. So, even if women were 
beginning to move into the top ranks, they may see their gains being slowed or even 
reversed. As the RAE-induced labor market becomes more restricted, it makes even 
more sense not to hire women in case they take maternity leave for example. 
Naturally, no one is going to admit that in a survey. The RAE system itself is so 





Table 7. Logistic regression results for membership of the Economic History Society, 
UK-based academics with research interests in Economic History, 2007.
Std. Std.
Coeff. error  OR error
(β) of β [exp(β)] for OR
Intercept 0.114 0.162 NA NA
Female -0.412* 0.2 0.663* 0.133
Type of department
Economics (broadly-defined) -0.949** 0.195 0.387** 0.076
Type of institution
THES 2006 list -0.56 0.175 0.942 0.164
Celtic Fringe 0.104 0.223 1.11 0.248
Number of cases 611
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 29.78(4)**
Pseudo R² 0.04
Akaike Information Criterion 1.337
Notes: The data are from the Economic History Society Census 2007, and the sample is 
restricted to all academic staff currently employed on contracts.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Source: EHS Census 2007
Log. (relative odds) Odds ratio
 
 
With regard to the EHS membership only, a number of different ordered logistic 
regression were run with rank as the dependent variable. Also, a number of logit 
regressions were run with professorial rank as the dependent variable. None of the 
models was statistically significant from the intercept model. So, there is no evidence 
of a gender effect on rank within the EHS membership. This might imply that women 
are less likely to join the EHS than men are. It may also signify that membership of 
such an academic society helps women in their careers, perhaps through mentoring, 
networking or other types of support. In order to investigate these issues further, a 
logistic regression was run using EHS membership as the dependent variable. The 
results are shown in Table 7. The coefficients for the Celtic Fringe and THES2006 are 
not statistically significant. So, there is no evidence that the society’s membership is 
concentrated in highly ranked institutions (by the THES ranking) or in England. 
However, the coefficients for ‘female’ and ‘economics departments’ (broadly-
defined) are statistically significant and also negative. This implies that women and 
those in economics, management or business departments are less likely to join the 
society. Men have 1.5 times the odds of joining the EHS than women do (p <0.05). 
Those outside of the economics and management departments had 2.6 times the odds 
of joining the society than researchers based inside those departments (p <0.01).  
 
It is a reasonable assumption that membership of the EHS is a good signal that 
Economic history is likely to be the main focus of the academic’s research profile. 
The society is the main academic society for the subject; is well-funded; maintains an 
annual conference, and has specialist committees including a women’s committee. So, 
if women and those in economics departments are under-represented, it may be a sign 18 
that the economic historians are moving out of economics departments and that 
women are leaving the discipline. These results would be consistent with work 
already undertaken on the RAEs and the UK academic labor market.  
 
   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Women’s careers in academic economics seem to lag behind men in a number of 
countries. In the UK case, the RAE system may hamper them further. The RAEs 
burden those at lower ranks; who are part-time or untenured or who have had career 
breaks.  In the UK, as elsewhere, women are relatively more likely to be in these 
vulnerable categories. Another problem facing UK economic historians are the RAEs’ 
effects on interdisciplinary research and careers. When an academic is both female 
and an economic historian it might be expected that the problems are compounded. As 
the  RAE  systems  are  highly  subjective  and  the  grading  methods  are  not  made 
transparent ex ante, there is a strong suspicion that they favor the entrenched elite. 
The UK elite is disproportionately male. Economic History Society membership may 
ameliorate  some  of  the  problems  for  women,  perhaps  due  to  networking  effects. 
However, women seem less likely to join the society in the first place than men are. 
 
If the RAEs have increased pressures on the lower ranks, they have provided a boost 
to the careers of established academics. Women are not heavily represented at these 
ranks. Interestingly, there is evidence of how the RAE system allows some academics 
to demand a premium. In this study, it is visible as a premium in rank for moving to 
areas with low RAE scores, i.e. a celtic premium. The effect is noticeable amongst the 
economics family of departments, but not for history. The celtic nations may be at a 
disadvantage  to  England,  perhaps  due  to  employment  opportunities  for  spouses. 
However, any such drawbacks apply to the whole institution or region and do not vary 
with the type of department. A departmental-level effect is more likely to be due to 
the RAE than any other cause. No celtic institution received a 5 or 5* in RAE2001 for 
economics or management, except for Cardiff University. Low performers in the RAE 
may be under greater pressure to fast-track researchers to professorial rank, in order to 
compete in the RAE-based labor market.  
 
The RAE system boosts certain sections of the academic community at the expense of 
others, simply because of their place in the career cycle. This means that there is a 
persistence of the gender gap, even though women are entering academia in greater 
numbers. So, the RAE systems seem to be widening that gap as they allow top-ranked 
men to demand premia. Although the system has undergone reforms and will be 
replaced shortly, the evidence presented here shows that there is no Whig history of 
constant progress for women’s careers. National policies can distort the labor market 
in particular countries and undermine the gains which women have made. Larry 
Summers’ belief that women were less suited to quantitative work certainly does not 
explain why they were underrepresented at the top ranks in history schools. It also 
does not explain why they were well represented amongst accounting historians. 
However, his comments should enlighten us about the importance of discriminatory 
attitudes amongst the academic elite. They are the people who are called upon to 
devise systems such as the Research Assessment Exercises.  




Variable           Dummy variable equals 1 if condition is met, 0 otherwise 
 
Female  Academic is female               
EHS    Academic is a member of the Economic history Society   
THES    Institution is in Times Higher World University Rankings 2006 
Institution  Institution is a post 92 institution (former Polytechnic)   
Lon    Institution is in London             
Roe    Institution is in England but not in London         
Cf    Institution is in Wales, Scotland or N. Ireland       
Loc1    Institution is in England             
Loc2    Institution is in Scotland             
Loc3    Institution is in N. Ireland             
Loc4    Institution is in Wales              
Dept1    Academic is in a History department (broadly defined)     
Dept2    Academic is in an economics department (broadly defined)    
Dept3    Academic is in a department not related to Depts. 1 and 2     
Dept4    Academic is in a special Economic history center       
Rank1    Academic is early career             
Rank2    Academic is a lecturer               
Rank3    Academic is a senior lecturer or reader         
Rank4    Academic is a professor             
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